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not necessarily less talented, often their first book is their best
book. Their first book has expressed what they had inside themselves to express and they don't improve because their inspiration
flags and it isn't replaced by a growing craft skill because they are
not systematic craftsmen improving over time. I think there are
exceptions; maybe Philip Roth is an interesting exception, I would
argue. But, as I say, the movement from expression in the classical
sense of imitation leading to incremental improvement to the modem romantic sense of inspiration and individuality may well involve a loss in quality, although it is a judgment that no one really
is able to make responsibly.
CRITIQUE***
WILLIAM T. BRAITHWAITE****

Judge Posner has given considerable energy to exploring the
connections between law and economics and between law and literature. He has sought to find out what contributions these two subjects, or disciplines, can make to the law, and he has approached
this question at the levels of both theory and practice. He has considered economics and literature as they bear upon jurisprudence,
or philosophy of law, and also as they bear upon the actual working of rules of law in the world of affairs.
In respect of what economics and literature can offer to the theory and practice of law, Judge Posner has weighed both subjects in
the balance, and he finds literature wanting. He believes economics to be far superior to literature in both an instrumental and a
substantive capacity. He concludes that economics is superior to
literature as a tool of analysis, and in what it can teach about the
effect of legal rules in practice. He concludes that economics is
also superior, in what it can teach about jurisprudence, in respect
of the theory of human action it embodies or assumes.
I cannot claim to know about economics what Judge Posner
knows. I have, however, read his book on law and literature, and
since I have been teaching in that field for ten years, I have also
given some thought to most of the issues he raises about whether
and how the study of literature can contribute to the study of law.
*** The Great Books Society of Loyola University Chicago School of Law invited
Professors William T. Braithwaite and George Anastaplo to participate in a roundtable
discussion of law and literature. Presented here are critiques of RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
****
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. B.A., Virginia
Military Institute, 1961; J.D., Washington & Lee University, 1964.
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I am grateful for the opportunity to raise with him directly some of
the questions brought to mind by my reading of his book.
.
One of the works of literature Judge Posner has lectured on, debated, and written about is Herman Melville's short novel, Billy
Budd. A young and handsome but unsophisticated sailor impressed into service on an 18th century English warship is falsely
accused of conspiring to incite mutiny. Unable to defend himself
with words, he strikes his accuser a blow that proves fatal. The
ship's captain, a witness to the killing, knows Billy's moral innocence, but believes that military law obliges a court-martial.
Although troubled at condemning a man guilty in his act but
blameless in his intent, the court's members bend to the captain's
arguments for conviction, and Billy Budd is hanged.
In chapter 11 of Billy Budd, the author, speaking in his own
name, raises the question of the relation between "knowledge of
the world," that is, practical wisdom or prudence, and "knowledge
of human nature," which I take to be part of philosophic wisdom,
or simply wisdom. He narrates a conversation with an unnamed
''senior scholar" who made the following observation:
In a matter of some importance I have seen a girl wind an old
lawyer about her little finger. Nor was it the dotage of senile
love. Nothing of the sort. But he knew law better than he knew
the girl's heart. Coke and Blackstone hardly shed so much light
into obscure spiritual places as the Hebrew prophets. And who
were they? Mostly recluses.6
The unnamed senior scholar seems to me to be saying something
like this. One can get from the books of the law (which are essentially historical and political in content), a "knowledge of the
world" sufficient to serve the ordinary purposes of life. This kind
of practical wisdom does not, however, shed much light upon the
darker corners of the human heart. For that, a deeper wisdom is
needed, the kind available only from study of the writings and
thoughts of men who are enough removed from worldly affairs to
have the leisure needed for thinking about the deepest questions.
Lawyers and judges are too much in the world of practical affairs
to have this leisure, even if they should have the mind and temper
for such thought. Hence we must turn to the reclusive Hebrew
prophets of the Old Testament. and, perhaps, Mclville may aiso be
6. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 75 (Harrison Hayford & Merton M. Sealts, Jr.,
eds., Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 1962).
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suggesting other men like them, such as the philosophers and the
great poets.
We can put Melville's point this way. A lawyer must certainly
know some psychology and, for the occasional exceptional case,
the psychology the lawyer needs to know can be learned from studying the Bible.
How much does a lawyer need to know about the human heart?
How can one best come by whatever such knowledge the lawyer
needs? In particular, does one learn more about the human heart
from studying the books of the greatest writers on economicssuch as Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and Karl Marx-or from
Plato, Shakespeare, and the Bible? What would we have to assume
about human nature in order to defend the opinion that economics
can teach more about psychology than literature?
ii.

Judge Posner has also written on Shakespeare's Merchant of
Venice, one of two plays Shakespeare set in that city, the other
being Othello. The thirty-seven plays in the Shakespearean canon
are set in a variety of political regimes and in a variety of locales,
including London, rural England, Rome, Venice, Athens, and Vienna. I believe the plays provide an indication of what Shakespeare saw life to be like in the different regimes and locales in
which he set them.
The two Venetian plays should be of special interest to Americans, for the commercial republic in the Venice of which Shakespeare wrote is in some ways like the commercial republic our own
Founding Fathers may have had in mind. Thus, it may be instructive to look at Othello and Merchant of Venice as poetic images of
the advantages and shortcomings of life in a regime devoted to promoting those exchanges for personal gain that constitute
commerce.
Othello is a Moor, a pagan man of color living in a cosmopolitan
city ruled by white Europeans. He is also a courageous general,
and it is for his military prowess that the Venetian government has
hired him to help defend the city against the Turks. One wonders
why Venice could not have found a competent military commander from among its own citizens. Can we imagine Israel hiring
mercenary soldiers?
What prompted, if news reports are to be believed, numerous
desertions from the Soviet Army by Lithuanian soldiers upon that
country's assertion of its independence? Are the most able men in
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Venice too much occupied with commerce and the politics of encouraging commerce to study the art of war? Should we expect a
city as much given to commerce as was Venice to produce a Lee or
a Grant, an Eisenhower or a Marshall?
The Merchant of Venice reveals another defect in the city's institutions. The Jewish moneylender, Shylock, seeks to enforce his famous, or infamous, "pound of flesh" contract against the Christian
merchant, Antonio. The contract is clearly unconscionable, perhaps even criminal, but the Duke of Venice, who is the city's chief
judicial officer, feels unable to justify a judgment for Antonio. He
believes this would compromise the enforceability of contracts,
upon which Venice's power and reputation as a center of trade depend. So he is obliged to send for a judge from another city.
The Venice presented by Shakespeare is a city that fails to educate its own judges and generals and so must hire foreigners to lead
its soldiers and preside in its courts. We wonder about the relation
between commerce and patriotism. Would a sensible soldier want
a Donald Trump or Michael Milken for his platoon leader? Are
men of this character likely to volunteer to put their own very
comfortable, not to say luxurious, lives in danger in order to defend the intangible freedoms of others?
We wonder, too, about the relation between commerce and justice. In particular, we wonder what kind of community, and what
kind of education, are necessary to produce the best lawyers and
judges?
Ill.

One view of the education needed by one who would live his life
in the law was set out by Thomas Jefferson in a letter written probably in the 1770s. An autographed copy of this letter is owned by
the University of Pennsylvania Law School and was published in
7
its law review in 1971.
This letter, and others Jefferson wrote on the same subject, leave
little doubt that he believed lawyers should have what we today
call a general liberal education. To him, this included both the
natural sciences and the humanities. He prescribed readings in
mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, anatomy, zoology, and botany. He prescribed readings in ethics and religion, in politics and
history, in rhetoric, oratory, and literature. And of course he Drescribed re.qding ---s in. law--Cuke, Bacon, Blackstone, and others.
7. Commentary, Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study, 119 U. PA.
L. REV. 823, 833-38 (1971).
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One feature of Jefferson's curriculum that is striking to today's
lawyer is the proportion between readings that are specifically legal
and readings in other subjects. It seems safe to say he believed that
mastering the craft, the methods, and the corpus of the law was
only one part of a lawyer's education. Science and literature were
just as important as Blackstone.
The question of what place literature has in the education of a
lawyer is, as I believe Jefferson's letter suggests, larger than the
question, sometimes heard today, of whether the law school curriculum should include literature. Focusing on the law school curriculum deflects attention from the question of what kinds of things
should be studied in preparation for law school. Judge Posner has
been among those challenging the supposition that the law is best
studied as a self-sufficient discipline isolated from other subjects.
In this, he seems to me to be on solid ground, supported as he is by
Jefferson's view that the lawyer's education must go far beyond the
covers of Blackstone.
On the other hand, I wonder whether Jefferson's view of the education of a lawyer can be made congruent with Judge Posner's
suggestion of the architectonic status of economics as an instrument for legal analysis. Of course, it may be that the Jeffersonian
model of legal education is impractical, or has been superseded by
history, or even was unsound when Jefferson conceived it. However this may be, his letter can provide the impulse for us to wonder whether there is as great a disproportion as Judge Posner has
so ably argued between the contribution that economics can make
to the law and the contribution that literature can make. One way
we might focus our curiosity on this point is to ask whether Jefferson's 1770s view that a liberal education is the best legal education
has any vitality in the American law schools of today.
CRITIQUE
GEORGE ANASTAPLO*****

I must confess that I was surprised when I settled down to read
Judge Posner's Law and LiteratureI in preparation for this discussion. I had read two dozen reviews of the book and had attended a
panel discussion about it-and had formed the impression that
*****
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago; Professor Emeritus of Political
Science and Philosophy, Rosary College; Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The University of
Chicago. A.B., 1948, J.D., 1951, Ph.D., 1964, The University of Chicago.
8. POSNER, supra note 3.
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Judge Posner was decidedly hostile to having law and literature
courses in the law school curriculum. Not only was this the gist of
what I had gotten from the law and literature professors who had
criticized the book in law journals, but it was also what was suggested by those reviewers who were friendly to the book.
I was startled, therefore, to discover how friendly Judge Posner
is to law and literature courses. He does have reservations, of
course, but this should not keep academicians interested in those
courses from putting his repeated endorsements of them to good
use, especially since he is known as a conservative. His generous
support ought to be welcomed, even as particular readings by him
of texts are challenged.
Judge Posner recognizes that students do not come to law school
as well prepared as they should be and that they need to know
much more about the humanities than they do these days, to which
law and literature courses can contribute. 9 Students, in the process
of thus becoming better educated, should also become better
equipped to write. Consider, as well, the following endorsement by
Judge Posner:
Most of the issues that would be discussed in [a law and literature course] could, it is true, be covered in a course on jurisprudence or legal process stressing the rhetoric, ethical
underpinnings and dilemmas, interpretive problems, and epistemology of law. But such a course is not likely to be so vivid,
memorable and entertaining as a well-taught course in law and
literature. '
His endorsements should be exploited by those who believe that
law and literature courses begin to make up for deficiencies in both
students and teachers. Such courses suggest that life may be much
more meaningful and hence more interesting than it is widely believed to be. When one reads certain first-class authors, one realizes that most of what one thinks and feels, as well as most of what
is thought and felt by many people around one, may be in need of
serious examination.

The failure of law and literature advocates to respond properly
to Judge Posner's book reflects, I suspect, shortcomings in their
ability to read with imagination and to use the rhetorical skills of
which he makes so much. Those advocates should he Wh1e t
9. See, e.g., id. at 360-61.
10. Id. at 358.

tot,-
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advantage of his interests and concessions and to notice what is
favorable, not only what is unfavorable, to their cause in his book.
No doubt, their reservations about the law and economics studies
of which Judge Posner is a champion make him suspect to the
more humanistically-inclined law professors.
Robert Maynard Hutchins, when he was President of the University of Chicago, used to justify the presence of the professional
law school on a university campus by saying that often it was only
there that the student was taught to read with care. (His own experience had included service as Dean of the Yale Law School.) If
law and literature advocates were themselves more skilled in reading, they would be better equipped to make a proper critique of
whatever may be troublesome in the Posner position. Instead,
their own readings of texts are often more questionable than his.
Judge Posner has useful things to say about the texts he examines in his book. His limitations, such as they are, are largely those
of his time or circumstances. He, as a distinguished legal scholar,
very much relies on authorities, systematically inventorying
sources and schools of thought in a fashion familiar to readers of
law journals. The most serious difficulties in his interpretations of
text are not generally noticed by his most vigorous law and literature critics because they share with him certain contemporary assumptions about what the most careful reading requires and looks
like.
ii.

I will now attempt to illustrate what I have been saying by considering, however briefly, three well-known subjects about which
Judge Posner has something to say. The range of his interests is
reflected in examples taken from ancient and modern literary texts
and from the law that are probably familiar to most of you. An
examination of what he particularly has to say about a Greek play,
a play by Shakespeare, and a United States Supreme Court Justice
should provide a fair indication of how Judge Posner works and
what serious criticism of him should notice.
First, consider the Greek play, which is perhaps the greatest
play ever written, Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannos. Judge Posner has
useful things to say here, but he does not go deeply enough. This is
not, strictly speaking, his fault, since the same complaint can be
made about most recognized classical scholars today. There is, for
example, a general tendency to confuse what Oedipus did with
what the gods ordained. It seems, however, to have been Oedipus'
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character and misconceptions that led to the form of the consequences of his fulfillment of the prophecies that he dreaded with
respect to parricide and incest. The fundamental presumptuousness of Oedipus may be seen not only in his reckless determination
to steer clear of his home in Corinth upon hearing at Delphi the
dreadful prophecies about himself, but also in his eventual selfblinding (as if he then knew all that he would ever need to learn)
and in his tendency to attribute to the gods everything that happened to him. In short, it is a mistake to consider Oedipus' interpretation of events to be the same as Sophocles'.
Judge Posner considers the pollution visited upon Thebes to be a
result of Oedipus' offenses, the offenses of parricide and incest. 1'
But, so far as we are told in the play, the incest does not trouble
Apollo, however much both Oedipus and his mother-wife are horrified by it. Both parricide and incest depend, at bottom, on a lack
of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge in turn depends on a thoughtfulness for which Oedipus does not seem to be equipped. He is
good at answering questions (that is, solving riddles); he is far less
skilled at asking questions. One could well consider what the Socratic responses, and especially questions, would have been to the
dreadful revelations offered Oedipus at Delphi.
I have noticed that Apollo, unlike Oedipus, is far more concerned by Oedipus' parricide than by his incest, at least so far as
the Delphic explanation of the pollution at Thebes is a reflection of
Apollo's concerns. But, we should also notice, it is not simply the
parricide as parricide that troubles Apollo, but rather the parricide
as regicide. (This is related, I mention in passing, to certain
problems that Judge Posner has in his reading of Aeschylus'
Orestia.) This is but one of many indications in the works of the
greatest playwrights of the fundamental character of the political,
not only in the ordering but also in the understanding of human
thought and action. It should be evident that whatever merit this
point has extends beyond Judge Posner's reading of these plays to
the law and economics movement in which he first distinguished
himself. Law, as traditionally understood, was much more rooted
in, and in the service of, the political and hence the moral virtues
(especially justice) than modern legal theorists seem to recognize.

I turn now to Shak,-Pre

iii.
1y.....

;i

. ...

t

__g

1Fu_

has to say about the funeral speeches by Brutus and Mark Antony
11.

Id. at 30.
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in Julius Caesar. Anyone interested in those speeches-and all of
us as students of law should be-can profit from Judge Posner's
discussion here. But there are problems with an approach, here
and elsewhere, which makes as much of the amorality of rhetoric
as his does.
Judge Posner does not seem to appreciate why Shakespeare gave
Antony the more effective speech over Julius Caesar's body or, indeed, why he even had such a scene in the play, whatever his ultimate source for it. The key to the scene is not the character of
rhetoric but rather the character of the audience. (Judge Posner
does seem to be aware of this, at least up to a point.) We are meant
to see what has happened to Rome, a city which can be said to
have been corrupted by its conquests (or by an obsession with, to
use law and economics language, maximization of wealth). The
emphasis in Rome is now on self-interest and advantageous personal loyalties, not on the common good and republican virtue.
Brutus' highmindedness would have been effective once, but at a
time when it probably would not have been needed to counter the
kind of threat Caesar now poses. Judge Posner suggests that it is
not yet time in Rome for such an approach as Brutus'; rather, he
should have said, the time has gone.
What, then, did Rome need? Was Julius Caesar, for all his
faults, as good as Rome was going to get after years of civil war?
On the other hand, if Brutus was to be able to follow seriously the
reformation he intended, should he not have had recourse to more
severity, not less, getting rid of the volatile Mark Antony along
with Julius Caesar? Be that as it may, Aristotle would counsel us
that it is not salutary to suggest that rhetorical masterpieces are to
be expected in dubious causes, for to do so is to fail to recognize
the pervasive influence of a hierarchy of ends. No doubt, rhetoric
can sometimes seem amoral, but that tends to be in the short run.
Is it not usually easier to speak finely and in a sustained way about
the best things and the most noble ends? Underlying this question
is a proper understanding about the relation of nature to truth,
something that the modern intellectual is not usually equipped to
address. (This inadequacy may be seen in the tendency to transform "legal reasoning" into sophistry.)
All this obliges the thoughtful statesman to consider what character is appropriate for a people equipped to make a republic work
properly. What, we may well ask, is shaping the character of our
people and what can be done about it? We need only recall, in
order to be moved to take this question seriously, the shallowness,
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if not even the demagoguery, of "effective" political discourse
among us in recent years.
Judge Posner recognizes that "we live in one of the most licentious cultures in the history of the world." 12 But here he, as a conservative, joins most liberals both in insisting that "literature does
not make us better (or worse) people"' 13 and in not liking "the idea
of letting politics shape [our] cultural life."' 14 If our "culture" is
indeed as licentious as Judge Posner believes, how did it get that
way? Is it bad that it should be thus and, if so, can anything be
legitimately done about it by the community?
I, as some of you know, have long argued for the abolition of
broadcast television in the United States, that very television which
is both an important cause and a pernicious effect of our corruption. Certainly, the market cannot be depended on to remedy our
present condition. If anything, market demands have been contributing incessantly to the deterioration we are witnessing. Also
contributing to all this are constitutional interpretations that, like
much else in our lives, subvert the significance of politics. This
subversion depends as well on a depreciation of that nature in the
service of which the most thoughtful statesman is enlisted.
iv.
My third "case study" draws upon Judge Posner's assessment of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Judge Posner regards him, along
with Chief Justice John Marshall, as one of the "two greatest
judges in our history."' 5 I, on the other hand, regard Justice
Holmes generally as a bad influence. His emphasis, as in his celebrated treatise on the common law,' 6 upon the "experience" rather
than upon the "logic" of law does not take sufficient account of
what shapes and illuminates experience. His positivist anti-natural-right doctrines eventually led to the denaturing of the common
law in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins,'7 a thoughtless surrender by Justice Holmes's disciples to the Secessionist principles against which
the young Holmes had fought so gallantly in the Civil War. All
this is grounded in Hobbesian materialism and a denial of justice as
an enduring standard.
This is the sort of judgment that can be passed upon Justice
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

333.
358.
iUl.
292.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed. 1963).

304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
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Holmes as a common-law scholar. His influence in constitutional
law is mixed. We have suffered for some seventy years from his
"clear and present danger" test. And when he tried to correct the
damage he had done in Schenck' 8 to the First Amendment, he
came up with the-market-as-the-best-test-of-truth talk, something
which Judge Posner has been induced to extend to assessments of
literary works as well.' 9 The emphasis is thus placed not on the
intrinsic character of a work and on standards which endure for
judging works, but rather on the workings of the market over time.
Nor is it appreciated that to the extent that the market does work
here, it is because of nature-based standards which somehow appeal even to the unreflecting.
Justice Holmes was, in some ways, the Mark Antony of American jurisprudence, but without the eroticism which eventually redeemed Antony somewhat. That is, Justice Holmes helped to
corrupt further a people already in decline, even while he remained
personally attractive. Like Mark Antony, Justice Holmes had an
effective "style." His callous, and perhaps misinformed, opinion in
Buck v. Bell 20 is extolled by Judge Posner as "a first-class piece of
rhetoric."' 2 1 We are again moved to wonder how rhetoric should
be responsibly described.
Even more impressive, Judge Posner argues, is the Holmes dissenting opinion in Lochner,21 "a rhetorical masterpiece. ' ' 23 "It is
not," Posner says, "a good judicial opinion. It is merely the greatest judicial opinion of the last hundred years."24 But, I presume to
suggest, the Lochner case does not matter as much, nowhere near
as much, as Judge Posner evidently believes: the United States
could not have remained indefinitely the only major country in the
Western World without power in its governments to control the
economy, which is what the Court's reading of the Due Process
Clauses and the Constitution in Lochner meant." To make as
much of the Lochner dissent as Judge Posner does is to make too
much of rhetoric in the more limited sense of that ancient and noble discipline.
18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
19. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 15, 73-74, 327, 330, 333, 334-35.
20. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
21. POSNER, supra note 3, at 289.
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23. POSNER, supra note 3, at 285.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 286.
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V.

All this bears upon how the Constitution should be read. It is
far from clear to me that most legal scholars today do read it properly. Among the consequences of intellectual developments to
which Justice Holmes contributed is a shift away from politics and
hence law as sovereign to a greater reliance upon the social sciences, whether history, psychology, social dynamics (Marxism), or
economics. The majesty of justice is somehow lost sight of in this
substitution, that justice to which traditional jurisprudence is dedicated and of which the greatest literature is very much aware.
I should not leave these assessments of Judge Posner's judgment
as a legal scholar without putting myself at risk by indicating
which judges or opinions I think more of than he does. Superior in
learning to Justice Holmes is Justice Joseph Story, whose influence
can be expected to be revived when we return to our senses. (It is
the Story argument in Swift v. Tyson 26 that Erie presumes to replace.) As for twentieth century opinions, there are several candidates for preeminence: Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education,27 however poorly-crafted in some respects, is certainly greater than the Holmes dissent in Lochner.
More eloquent than anything Justice Holmes did in the opinions
praised by Judge Posner is the opinion for the Court by Justice
Robert H. Jackson in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.2" More important than the Lochner issue is the issue addressed by Justice Hugo L. Black in his opinion for the Court in
the Steel Seizure Case,29 especially since executive usurpation remains a serious problem for us down to this day. (I need not say
anything about Justice Black and the First Amendment.) And for
common-law analyses, Judge Benjamin Cardozo (New York Court
of Appeals) is more to be reckoned with than Justice Holmes,
whether in Massachusetts or in Washington, with opinions that are
often more solid than Judge Posner gives him credit for, however
sensitive Judge Posner's discussion of the Cardozo opinion in
31
Palko30 may be.

26.

41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

(1938).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 793 (1969).
31. POSNER, supra note 3, at 294.
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vi.
Much of what I have said on this occasion depends on the traditional recognition of politics as the supreme discipline. Moral
judgment is needed in making sense both of literature and of law.
(Law is immediately in the service of the political art.)
A proper reading of the greatest texts can elevate one's sights
even as it cuts one's ego down to a healthy size. This is especially
important for lawyers today whose specializations narrow their understanding and whose easy access to big money facilitates their
corruption. The alternative is an impoverished way of life, especially for our most talented people: as their lives become more and
more pampered and private, they are less and less open to the appeal of grand civic achievements.
If the best literature is to help us become what we are truly capable of, we must be alert to what to look for, including what minds
greater than ours have considered the most serious questions. Professional scholars ultimately cannot be relied upon here, however
useful they may be. There is something mechanical about the "research" that Judge Posner considers of overriding importance for
professors at "leading law schools."' 32 One can see here, too, the
influence of the market and its promotion of novelty. Our principal concern as students of the law, however, should not be with
devising something new but rather with discovering what others
have long known.
It is in this conservative spirit, which is dedicated to recovering
and preserving the best of what has gone before, that I commend to
readers the instructive insights and useful things in Judge Posner's
speaks
book, including his salutary insistence that "what literature
33
to are the eternal problems of the human condition.

32.
33.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 357. For further discussion of topics mentioned here, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE (1983); and George
Anastaplo, Freedom of Speech and the FirstAmendment: Explorations,21 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1941 (1990) (on classical texts and the First Amendment).

